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ABSTRACT
The effect of competition on quality in home health care is not well understood,
especially given extensive entry regulation. We analyze the universe of hospital
discharges during 2006 for Medicare beneficiaries (about 4.5 million) and a subset of
522,232 transitions from hospitals to home health agencies to determine whether there is
a significant difference in home health utilization, hospital readmission rates, and health
care expenditures in states with and without entry regulation. We identify these effects by
looking across regulated and non-regulated states within Hospital Referral Regions,
which characterize well-defined health care markets and frequently cross state
boundaries. We find entry regulation in home health to result in lower resource intensity,
yet similar rates of hospital readmission for patients admitted to home health.
Nevertheless, entry restrictions substantially lowered the use of home health and
increased overall hospital readmissions with little or no effect on overall health care
expenditures.
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INTRODUCTION
The effect of competition on quality in health care markets is not well understood. While
the evidence generally points to a positive relationship between competition and quality,
especially under regulated prices, the quality of care implications of policies aiming to
slow the growth of health care costs by limiting firm entry and thus competition are
unclear. One such policy tool is Certificate of Need (CON) laws designed to provide
states with control over entry, expansions, and substantial capital investments by health
care facilities. Since the effectiveness of CON laws in restricting utilization is disputed,
there is large variation across states in the degree of regulatory oversight.

CON laws exist for various types of health care providers including hospitals, nursing
homes, rehabilitation centers and home health agencies. CON for hospitals and to a
lesser extent for nursing homes and rehabilitation centers give state governments the
authority to restrict major capital investment such as the construction of new facilities,
expansions to existing ones, and the purchasing of expensive technology (MHCC, 2001).
Hence, CON imposes restrictions on both incumbent hospitals and potential entrants.
This is not the case in home health, a labor intensive industry with no major capital
investment, where CON operates exclusively as a mechanism to restrict entry of new
home health agencies. With fewer agencies in CON markets, state regulators may be
more effective at having a positive influence on standardizing the care delivered by the
home health agencies in their state. However, restricted entry leads to markets with
fewer providers and, thus, reduced market competition among agencies. In a market with
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regulated prices, such as in home health, reduced competition may have a negative effect
on the quality of home health care delivered.

On the other hand, CON for home health may also influence the rate of hospital
discharges to home health. With evidence that effective use of home health care services
can lower the rate of hospital readmissions (Sochalski, et al. 2009, Naylor, et al. 2004,
Kane, et al. 2000, Penrod, et al. 1998, Penrod, Kane and Kane 2000, Hadley, et al. 2000),
understanding the role of CON for home health can have broad health care implications.
In particular, if there are fewer hospital discharges to home health in CON states and
admissions to home health contribute to lower rates of rehospitalization, CON for home
health may have important downstream effects on health care system rehospitalization
rates and expenditures.

There are two main objectives of this paper. First, we will evaluate whether there are
significant differences in the delivery of home health care between states with and
without entry regulation in terms of the resource intensity of home health services and the
quality of home health care among patients discharged to home health. Second, we will
describe the broader implications of such regulations in terms of the rate of hospital
discharge to home health care, overall hospital readmissions, and total health care
expenditures.

4

BACKGROUND
Hospital expansion in the 1970s, associated with excess bed capacity (Joskow 1980) and
reduced social welfare (Robinson and Luft 1985), led to the 1974 Federal Health
Planning and Resources Development Act, which mandated states to develop CON to
control utilization and third-party expense by controlling or reducing supply. When states
universally adopted CON for hospitals in the 1970s, 38 states also applied CON
regulation to the home health care sector. When the federal mandate was repealed in
1987, only 18 states continued active CON regulations for home health care (AHPA
2005, MHCC 2001).

The idea behind CON regulation was that it would prevent unnecessary duplication of
services and ensure appropriate care by concentrating the location of sophisticated
medical services to high-volume regional facilities with sufficient expertise and resources
(Smith-Mello 2004). Proponents of CON laws view restrictions on acquisitions and
expansions of hospitals as a way to achieve this goal (Ho 2004). Nevertheless, evidence
on the effectiveness of CON in lowering hospital costs of care, procedure volume and
mortality is mixed (Salkever 2000, Popescu, Vaughan-Sarrazin and Rosenthal 2006, Ho
2006, Ho, Ku-goto and Jollis 2009).

In home health markets, with little to no capital investment (CMS 2003) and labor as the
dominating input, the potential for cost savings from major capital expansions by
incumbent agencies is nonexistent. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a volumeoutcome relationship which would be needed for a home health CON to enhance quality

5

(Kass 1987).

In home health, service delivery is decentralized and provided by

individuals as opposed to teams; therefore individual-nurse volume is more relevant for
outcomes than agency volume. However, since nurses tend to work at full capacity even
in small-scale agencies, there is little rationale for concentrating volume at a small
number of agencies through entry restrictions.

An alternative rationale for CON

programs in home health is that they can enforce appropriate standards of care through
enhanced ability to monitor agencies. However, to date there is no evidence to suggest
CON in home health care is quality enhancing.

While the effect of CON on quality of home health care is not clear, the ability for CON
regulations to effectively limit entry of new agencies into the market is evident. Most
states with CON regulations follow specific policies and guidelines for the approval of
additional home health agencies in a given market, but in practice new agencies are rarely
approved. Therefore, markets in CON-regulated states are not contested, as incumbent
agencies are not threatened by potential entrants.1 Figure 1 characterizes the market for
home health by CON status in 2006. CON states have almost half the number of
agencies for their Medicare population (14.6 vs. 28.2 per 100,000 Medicare beneficiaries)
and are therefore more concentrated as measured by an agency-specific HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) (3,964 vs. 2,745).2

1

These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and District of
Columbia.
2

The Agency-HHI measures the degree of concentration for each agency in our sample. Competitive
markets are defined separately for each agency based on a weighted average of the agency’s market
concentration in the zip-codes of the clients they serve (zip-code level HHIs are calculated by squaring the
market share of each firm competing in the zip-code and then summing the resulting numbers).
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The price of a home health episode is fixed by Medicare through a Prospective Payment
System (PPS) for home health services.3 Under PPS, a single payment is given for a 60day episode of care, with payment for additional 60-day episodes if the patient is
recertified for continuing home health care. The reimbursement amount is a per-episode
fixed rate set at admission according to the severity of the patient's condition. To
determine severity, each Medicare episode is classified into one of 80 mutually exclusive
severity groups, called Home Health Resource Groups (HHRGs), which determine the
payment rate. Each episode payment is adjusted for differences in labor costs across
geographic areas.4 Since prices are regulated, providers can no longer compete for
patients based on price of services and instead must compete for patients on other
dimensions of their services such as resource intensity or quality of care. If the regulated
price is set above marginal cost for some baseline level of quality, then firms will
continue to improve service delivery to try to attract more of the available pool of
patients until marginal cost of delivering care equals the regulated price. Thus, economic
theory suggests that market competition in the presence of regulated prices can lead to
quality improvements (Beitia 2003, Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume 2006, Brekke,
Nuschler and Straume 2007, Calem and Rizzo 1995, Karlsson 2007, Gravelle and
Masiero 2000, Gravelle 1999, Lyon 1999, Wolinsky 1997, Ma and Burgess 1993, Allen
and Gertler 1991, Held and Pauly 1983, Pope 1989).

3

Medicare payments to home health are $20 billion annually and represent about 80% of payments to
home health for post-acute home care. Medicare beneficiaries who are determined by a doctor to have a
medical need for skilled care of limited duration in the home can qualify for coverage of home health
services on a part-time or “intermittent” basis. This type of home health care comprises a set of services
provided in the home, most often by registered nurses, rehabilitative therapists, social workers, or home
health aides (CMS, 2002).
4
While, in general, the amount of service provided does not affect the amount of reimbursement, certain
extremely high-cost episodes receive outlier payments.
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Most empirical studies of the relationship between competition and quality under
regulated prices found more competition to result in higher quality (as measured by lower
mortality)(Kessler and McClellan 2000, Gowrisankaran and Town 2003, Held and Pauly
1983, Kessler and Geppert 2005, Tay 2003, Sari 2002, Shen 2003, Shorten and Hughes
1988).

While the effect of market concentration on quality has been studied extensively in the
hospital sector, this relationship has received no attention in the home health care
industry. The case of competition in a hospital market will not necessarily apply to home
health. Unlike hospitals, where location provides a degree of market power, home health
agencies deliver services at the patient’s residence. Without location as a natural barrier
to competition, we might expect home health markets to be a highly competitive.
Similarly, unlike hospitals and other facilities that require major capital investments in
order to become operational, home health care is labor intensive and is expected to be
highly competitive absent of entry regulation.

However, states have imposed an artificial barrier on the number of competitors in a
given market by restricting the creation of new home health agencies through CON
regulation. While regulation may be more effective with fewer agencies to regulate, the
limited number of evidence-based standards of care in home health on which effective
service regulation can be based suggests that market competition may provide a superior
(self-enforcing) mechanism for promoting quality. With CON regulation creating
potentially opposing effects on quality, the net effect becomes an empirical question.
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Moreover, home health care is part of a larger health care system. More resource
intensive home care may increase its use by hospital discharge planners, who would
otherwise be sending the patient home (without home health care). If home health
agencies are effective at preventing rehospitalization for the marginal patient they serve,
increased use may reduce overall rehospitalization rates and thus offset Medicare’s costs
of increased home health expenditures. Therefore, the effect of competition for home
health care on overall health care expenditures is ambiguous.

EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
Following Gaynor (2006), we base our empirical specification on the equilibrium level of
quality (in a market with regulated prices). We assume that firms either maximize profit
or rely on surplus to support other objectives (e.g., a nonprofit agency could have a
different objective, yet rely on surplus to achieve it (Lakdawalla and Philipson 2006,
David 2009)). In addition, we assume that a welfare-maximizing regulator and utilitymaximizing consumers imperfectly observe the quality of home health services.

The equilibrium level of firm quality becomes

q *  f ( p , c(q * ), ms ( q * ), demand ( q * ))
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where p is the administratively set price per home health episode, c is the cost of a home
health episode at quality level q* , and ms is the firm’s market share. The right hand side
variables are a function of q* because the quality level chosen by an agency is likely to
affect its market share, cost, and willingness-to-pay for its services. That is, higher
quality firms will have higher costs, but at the same time are likely to attract more
customers, which in turn would lead to commanding a higher market share. To estimate
quality with independent right hand side variables, we replace the endogenous variables
with their exogenous determinants and estimate a reduced form equation. We replace
cost with cost shifters, demand with demand shifters, and measures of competition with
CON regulation for home health agencies.

Thus the econometric specification is:

q*  f ( p , CS , DS , CON ,  )

where CS and DS are cost and demand shifters respectively. Price is the fixed Medicare
price; cost shifters include market level variables that might influence factor prices such
as wages, patient-agency distance, availability of labor, and density of customer base;
demand shifters include patient-level variables that characterize patient illness severity
and service needs as well as market-level variables that capture general service demand.

Of concern here is remaining omitted variables that could be correlated with CON and
independently influence our quality indicators. The two most important are unobserved
10

patient characteristics such as illness severity and unobserved area-level characteristics
such as geographic variation in service use. If competition affects the severity of the
patients admitted to the home health agency, unobserved severity (i.e., severity that is not
captured by the risk adjustment) may be an issue if it independently influences the
resource intensity of home health service use and health outcomes. This may occur if
home health agencies that face less competitive pressure are more likely to refuse
complicated cases and hence, attract low-severity cases on average. Geographic variation
may be an issue if those areas that are more likely to have CON are the same areas that
are more likely to otherwise utilize more health care services.

We address both of these concerns with a specification that includes market-level fixed
effects (υm).

qi*    CS CSi   DS DSi  CON CON s  m   i

This specification is identified by the markets (m) that include parts of multiple states (s)
when those multiple states vary in their CON status. We used the Dartmouth Atlas for
Health Care's Hospital Referral Region (HRR) (Wennberg et al. 2004) as the market of
interest because it defines a contiguous locality within which most tertiary hospital care
referrals are contained and because it is the area most linked to geographic variation. Our
focus on clinical outcomes for patients discharged from and readmitted to hospitals
makes HRRs a natural geographic unit for defining markets. Approximately 13% of
patients in our sample reside in 32 HRRs (10%) that cross state boundaries where CON
rules are different. These HRRs are well spread across the U.S. in that they are in 32 of
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the 48 states in the analysis and 14 of the 18 CON states. Figure 2 illustrates the source
of our identification for the case of Pennsylvania, a non-CON state, in which 9 of 17
HRRs cross state boundaries. Six of these HRRs cross into CON states (New Jersey, New
York, and West Virginia). Our main specification essentially reduces to a comparison of
patients in states under CON regulation and patients in states under no entry regulation
within hospital referral regions that cross state lines. This within-HRR variation excludes
fixed unobserved factors tied to competition within HRRs and differential patterns of
health care service use across HRRs.

METHODS

Data Sources
We constructed a data set uniquely suited for this study by linking the 100% Medicare
Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR)5 file to the Medicare Home Health Agency
SAF (HHA-SAF)6 file for 2005 and 2006. These data contain diagnoses, procedures,
dates of admission and discharge, expenditures, and basic demographic information. The
HHA-SAF also includes detailed home health utilization information such as the number
and type of visits (skilled nursing care, home health aides, physical therapy, speech
therapy, occupational therapy, and medical social services). We augmented our data with
county-level market characteristics from the Area Resource File and hospital-level
characteristics from the American Hospital Association (AHA) file for 2005 and 2006.

5

The MedPAR file contains claims data for Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries admitted to
Medicare-certified inpatient hospitals and skilled nursing facilities (SNF).
6
The HHA-SAF contains claims data for Medicare home health admissions.
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Study Sample
We define our study population as fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries over 65.5
enrolled in Medicare between July 2005 and December 2006.7 We define our study
sample based on index hospitalizations which includes all hospitalizations except those
preceded by an acute or post-acute care stay in the 90 days prior to the hospitalization.
The focus on index hospitalizations in order to focus our analysis on patterns of care
following relatively new health events rather than patterns of care heavily influenced by
ongoing treatment in existing episodes of care. The sample includes hospitalizations in
fiscal year 2006 (October 2005 – September 2006) in acute care hospitals in the 48
contiguous states.

We construct two study samples from these index hospitalizations. Our primary sample
is based on home health admissions, consisting of 522,232 index hospitalizations that are
followed within 3 days of the hospital discharge date by a home health admission. Our
secondary sample is based on hospital discharge and is comprised of all index
hospitalizations that lead to a hospital discharge. This sample excludes in-hospital deaths
and discharges to hospice, long-term acute care, and inpatient rehabilitation, resulting in a
sample of 4,448,479 hospital discharges.

7

Despite the fact that the hospitalizations and home health admissions for the 15% of Medicare
beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage plans are not recorded, this is a comprehensive record of
hospitalizations and home health admissions for Americans over 65 given that 95% are covered by
Medicare.
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Variables
The key dependent variables for the sample of home health admissions include several
measures of resource intensity of home health services and rehospitalization rates as an
outcome measure of quality. The resource intensity measures include the total number of
visits, weighted by the skill level of the provider conducting the visit,8 the proportion of
visits by skill type (skilled nursing, home health aide, and all therapists), the length of
service (number of days between the first and last visit), and the frequency of visits
(weighted visits divided by length of service). We measure resource utilization within
the first 60-day episode of home health care as only 10% of these index episodes of care
are recertified for additional episodes beyond the first 60 days on service.

We identify readmissions rates to be our key quality related outcome measure for our
sample home health admissions following a hospital discharge. Given the fact that
avoiding rehospitalization is a primary goal of home health care among those who enter
home health from the hospital, readmission is generally viewed as the critical outcome of
home health. Moreover, mortality rates are too low in this population to be measured as a
reliable outcome. Shaughnessy and colleagues (2002) found hospitalization rates after
home health admission to be a valid and significant indicator of quality of home health
care. We measure rehospitalizations by linking home health admission claims to all
hospital discharge claims. We classified the timing of rehospitalizations into 60-day
intervals following a hospital discharge (0-60 days and 60 to 120 days).
8

For

There are six different home health care visit types: skilled nursing, physical therapy, occupational
therapy, speech language pathology, medical social services, and home health aide. Since these represent
different intensities of care and, hence different costs of resource use, we adjusted the count of all visits for
the relative value of each unit type (Welch, Wennberg and Welch 1996). The relative value is based on the
federally reported relative value units (RVUs) (Hsiao et al 1988).
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rehospitalization measures, subjects are censored in the rare event of death and after their
first rehospitalization.

For the sample of all hospital discharges, to achieve the goal of assessing the implications
of home health care, we measure the rate of home health admissions, rehospitalization
rates and total Medicare expenditures. Our unique dataset allows us to determine a home
health admission by tracking patients admitted to home health, as indicated by a home
health claim, within 3 days of hospital discharge. Rehospitalizations are estimated as
above for the home health sample. Medicare expenditures were defined as the amount
that Medicare actually paid for care as recorded in claims records. We included
Medicare-financed care in inpatient, skilled nursing facility (SNF), and home health.
Because payments for these types of care are made for care received over an interval of
days, we assign the expenditure to the 60-day interval associated with the first day of that
episode of care and define expenditures for the intervals 0-60 days and 60 to 120 days.
All expenditures are expressed in constant 2006 dollars. For completeness, we also
measure Medicare expenditures for the home health sample.

In addition to our key explanatory variable indicating which states have CON regulations,
our control variables are at the patient, hospital, county, and state level. Patient level
variables (demand shifters) include age, gender, race and measures of patient clinical
severity, using 104 diagnoses for the hospitalization variables and 28 patient
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comorbidities variables.9 Hospital-level variables (supply shifters) include ownership
status, medical school affiliation, number of licensed hospital beds, and hospital CON
regulation status. County-level variables capture both demand and supply shifters. These
variables include factors that capture potential variation across counties in the availability
of both acute and post-acute outlets (i.e., hospital beds per 100 persons, nursing home
beds per 100 persons), HMO enrollment rate, population size, density, urban status
education, income, and percentage of population over age 65.

Analysis
We conducted fixed-effect multivariable regression analysis of home health resource
utilization, rehospitalization, and expenditures, as a function of CON and the covariates
related to use and outcomes. The model used varied by outcome. We used ordinary least
squares for home health services: number of visits, length of service, frequency of visits,
and percent of visits by provider type. We used a GEE logistic model for the estimation
of home health admissions following hospital discharge. We estimated a fully interacted
discrete time Cox model for rehospitalizations. For Medicare expenditures, because of
the cluster of zero expenditures and the heavy right tail, we estimated a two-part model
where the first part was a logistic GEE and the second part was a generalized linear
model with a log link and gamma family. In all regressions we adjusted standard errors
for clustering at the HRR level. Model results are all expressed in terms of their marginal
effects.

9

We track the 103 most frequent DRGs as code them as categorical variables while characterizing the
remaining 10% into an “other” category. In addition, we have dummy variables for 28 comorbidities using
the Elixhauser method (Elixhauser et al., 1998).
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To better understand the contribution of adjustments for observable and unobservable
factors we estimate the marginal effect of CON without any adjustment, with adjustments
for observable factors without fixed effects, and with HRR fixed effects. One potential
limitation of the fixed-effect model is that, while improving the internal validity of our
estimates, the identification comes from those HRRs that cross state boundaries. These
33 HRRs represent approximately 13% of the full sample. Nevertheless, to assess the
external validity of this subset, we show the adjusted subsample marginal effects for
comparison to the adjusted effects for the whole sample.

RESULTS
Our primary sample consists of 522,232 hospital-to-home health transitions in 2006.
29.6% of these transitions occurred in CON states. From Table 1, we see that home
health admissions in CON states only differ slightly from non-CON states in terms of
patient characteristics, with patients in CON states more likely to be older, female, black,
and have heart failure and diabetes. There were more meaningful differences in the
hospitals and market characteristics. Hospitals in CON states were more likely to be nonprofit, larger, and affiliated to a medical school. Markets were similar in terms of
education and income levels, but CON states were less densely populated, had more
hospital beds available, were more likely to have CON for hospitals, and were more
likely to hospitalize patients in their last six months of life.

The home health practice pattern differences between CON and non-CON states are
shown in Table 2, highlighting a few significant differences in home health practice
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patterns across these states. The number of visits is essentially the same between CON
and non-CON states. (Unadjusted means are 10.59 visits vs. 10.71 for a difference of 0.125 visits, p-value=0.012). This difference remains small and statistically insignificant
across adjustment strategies. The length of service is slightly longer in CON states by an
unadjusted 0.673 days (p-value=0.336), but this difference shrinks and becomes
statistically insignificant in the adjusted models. However, the frequency of visits is
significantly less in CON states across specifications. In the final HRR fixed-effects
specification there are 0.011 (p-value<0.001) fewer visits per day in CON states. There
are also important differences in the skill mix where the proportion of visits by skilled
nursing is 0.049 less and by home health aides is 0.028 more in CON states suggesting a
lower intensity of skilled human capital in CON states.

The probability of discharge from the hospital to a home health agency is 1.5 percentage
points lower in CON vs. non-CON states (last column of the first row of results in Table
4). This 12.6% decline in the rate of discharge to home health is statistically significant,
large, and robust to our alternative specifications. There is little difference between the
overall adjusted result and the adjusted result in the subsample. The adjusted result is
about twice the size of the unadjusted result, and the fixed effect result.

The effect of entry regulation on rehospitalization rates is presented in Table 3. The top
panel reports results for hospitalized patients discharged to home health and the bottom
panel reports results for all hospitalized patients. Within the home health cohort, the final
fixed-effects model shows no statistically significant differences in rehospitalization
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rates. In the first 60 days after hospital discharge rehospitalization rates are higher by
only 0.51 percentage points (or 3.0%), but then are lower by 0.34 percentage points
(3.9%) in the subsequent 60 days. This suggests that home health care in non-CON states
may have a small influence in delaying rehospitalizations.

The other specifications in this table offer some additional suggestive evidence. The
fixed-effects specification brings the marginal effects closer to zero particularly in the
first 60 days suggesting observed shortcomings of home health in CON states may be an
artifact of geographic variations. Adjustments for observable factors also bring the
results closer to zero.

We see this in the comparison between the unadjusted

specification and the adjusted specification. The key driving factors here are variables
adjusting for patient severity suggesting that home health in CON states attracts a more
severe patient mix.

In the sample of all hospitalized patients, rehospitalization rates are slightly higher in
CON states with a marginal effect of .79 percentage points (or 4.7%) (p-value=0.057) in
the first 60 days. The result is stable with and without the fixed effect adjustment,
however the effect may not be generalizable to the entire sample because the adjusted
subsample effect is much stronger than the adjusted effect in the full sample.

Medicare expenditures are not statistically different between CON and non-CON states in
the fixed-effects specification. This is true within the sample of home health admissions
and among all hospital discharges.

It is notable that in the unadjusted analysis,
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expenditure in CON states for patients discharged to home health is nearly $500 higher
than in non-CON states, but is reduced close to zero after adjusting for patient mix. Costs
are lower in states with CON laws in the adjusted subsample and go up slightly with
fixed effects suggesting that the $123 cost difference for 120 days post discharge
estimated in the adjusted specification may be a lower bound and that costs within the
home health sample may be higher in CON states. For Medicare expenditures among all
hospital discharges, costs are lower in the first 30 days in CON states, but this effect is
not statistically significant in the most saturated fixed-effects specification. The lower
costs in the first 60 days after a hospital discharge is primarily a result of the lower use of
home health care services in CON states and most of these costs are offset by higher costs
beyond 60 days that can be attributed to the higher rates of rehospitalization.

DISCUSSION
States use a one-size-fits-all regulatory approach across different segments of the health
care industry. Regulation of resource utilization, such as CON laws, while used
predominantly to regulate capital expansions in the hospital sector, is commonly used in
labor-intensive environments such as the home health sector. Instead of regulating
capital investment, home health CONs take the form of entry restrictions.10 As a
consequence, it is nearly impossible for a potential home health entrant to demonstrate
“need”, as incumbent agencies are not constrained by capacity and face few hurdles when
it comes to expansion of services. Therefore, not surprisingly, CON regulation of home

10

This is not to say that the reasoning behind hospital CON makes practical sense. Many states dropped
their hospital CONs as it created wasteful bureaucratic pressure and most importantly, failed to slow the
growth in health care spending (Thorpe 1999, Salkever 2000, Field 2007).
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health leads to concentrated markets with about half the number of agencies compared
with states where entry is not regulated using CON.

We find home health care in CON states to be less resource intensive (lower frequency of
visits and lower skill mix), yet we did not find meaningful differences in quality based on
the fact that there were no detectible differences in rehospitalization rates among patients
admitted to home health from the hospital.

Hence, the quality effect that we

hypothesized was not confirmed, although the level of resource intensity could be viewed
as the dimension of “quality” on which home health agencies compete. If this is the case,
the stronger intensity of resource use in CON states did not translate into improved
quality outcomes. On the other hand, we found no evidence that regulation in home
health lowers the rate of hospital readmissions or resource intensity of home health care
as suggested by the view that limiting the number of home health agencies through CON
focuses monitoring efforts and results in better care. On net, it is possible that the anticompetitive and monitoring effects of CON regulation are canceling each other out.

While the delivery of home health services to those admitted does not appear to be much
different in CON states, overall health service delivery is different because CON
regulation is associated with 12.6% fewer home health admissions following hospital
discharge. This lower rate of home health admissions is accompanied by a slightly
higher rate of hospital readmission among all hospital discharges. Moreover, Medicare
expenditures overall are similar over 120 days but lower in CON states initially. This
suggests that the use of more home health episodes is costly (intensive margins), but
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because a higher rate of use of home health lowers the likelihood of rehospitalization
(extensive margins) and the associated expenditures, this home health use is not
associated with a detectible overall change in Medicare expenditures.

CON may not reduce the performance of home health agencies among the patients seen
by home health, but because home health in CON is used less frequently following
hospital admission, CON has negative implications for the broader health care system.
Although there are no overall differences in total Medicare expenditures, patients are
unlikely to be indifferent between the two models of care.
hospitalizations would seem preferable, all else equal.

A system with fewer

Thus, extensive margin

implications may be more important when considering the implications of entry
regulation.
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Appendix A: List of HRRs that span more than one state, the number of patients in our sample, and the
percent of population under CON
Hospital Referral Region
Albany
Allentown
Billings
Dothan
Durham
Erie
Evansville
Fort Smith
Jacksonville
Jonesboro
Kingsport
Lebanon
Louisville
Morgantown
New Haven
Norfolk
Paducah
Pensacola
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Portland
Roanoke
Salisbury
Sayre
Slidell
Spokane
Springfield
Tallahassee
Texarkana
Wilmington
Winchester
Winston-Salem

Non-CON State(s)

CON State

N

%CON

MA
PA
WY
GA / FL
VA
PA
IN / OH
OK
FL
MO
VA
NH
OH
PA
CT
VA
IN
FL
PA
PA
OR
VA
DE
PA
LA
ID
MO
FL
OK / TX
DE
VA
VA

NY
NJ
MT
AL
NC
NY
KY
AR
GA
AR
TN
VT
KY
WV
NY
NC
KY
AL
NJ
WV
WA
WV
MD
NY
MS
WA
AR
GA
AR
MD
WV
NC

34,285
27,027
9,045
9,860
24,665
14,415
12,127
5,865
28,023
6,094
8,929
4,569
31,702
9,260
26,509
19,784
10,487
15,533
63,470
45,421
16,364
15,576
8,523
4,527
2,593
20,044
15,914
11,456
5,864
15,869
6,135
17,955

94%
5%
91%
94%
82%
11%
8%
87%
13%
94%
53%
13%
84%
97%
5%
8%
89%
9%
15%
9%
24%
17%
60%
17%
12%
81%
17%
60%
5%
13%
20%
96%
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